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Trends in Usury Legislation-Current Interest
Overdue
MAXINE MASTER LONG*
The author describes the general usury statutes found in the
United States. After explaining the basic indices used to compute
the rates, the author proposes that the trend must continue to
favor floating interest rates.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Usury is a concept as old as human society, dating at least from
biblical times.' In order to understand and put current trends in
usury legislation into proper perspective, it is necessary to under-
stand the evolution of such legislation and the rationale behind it.
Only then can it be determined whether usury laws still serve a valid
purpose, or whether a radical modification, or perhaps a total aban-
donment, is appropriate.'
The word "usury" is derived from the same Latin root as ''use"
and refers to a charge imposed for the use of money.3 Throughout
history money has been regarded with suspicion and has not
been treated like other commodities, resulting in a "moral taint" on
* J.D., University of Miami School of Law, 1979; former member, University of Miami
Law Review.
1. See, e.g., Leviticus 25:35-37; Deuteronomy 23:19-20.
2. Franklin Ryan notes in the preface in his 1924 book, Usury and Usury Laws, that when
he began his study in 1921, he was advised to drop the subject and turn to a more fruitful
field of inquiry because "there was no problem; . . . all economists were agreed that usury
laws are a dead letter and that the laws had gotten on the statute books simply because
legislators could not understand the economic principles worked out by Jeremy Bentham in
1787 in his 'Letters in Defense of Usury.' "F. RYAN, Preface to USURY AND USURY LAws at x
(1924). Nevertheless, Ryan found enough new material to fill a book. Fifty-eight years later,
upon talking to local attorneys about the present article, I received essentially the same
advice. I too have proceeded with my inquiry and hope I have made a useful contribution to
a subject whose demise, like Mark Twain's, has been greatly exaggerated.
3. WESsTER's THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 2525 (1966).
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the charging of interest on the use of money.
Originally, any charge for the use of money or its equivalent was
forbidden.' As society and economic concepts developed, a distinc-
tion was made between loans with interest made to strangers and
loans to needy persons within the community.5 The former was per-
mitted and was recognized as preferable to letting the money lie
idle.' Even though society's economic need for sources of capital,
along with the corresponding interest costs of maintaining a supply
of capital, was recognized, money lending was still generally a prac-
tice shunned by the dominant classes in society and relegated to
minority group members.' This attitude persists today toward those
in the loan industry, such as pawnbrokers and small loan compa-
nies, who make consumer loans and charge the highest rates.
Interest rates are historically as much a moral as an economic
issue, and usury laws must be considered in this light. The per-
ceived social justification for setting interest rate ceilings must be
balanced against economic reasons for abandoning regulation of in-
terest rates. Purely economic arguments have not often prevailed
over a deep-seated and ancient distrust of those who make money
on others' need for money.8
4. Even today, Sharia, the Moslem religious and legal code followed in a number of
Islamic countries such as Saudi Arabia, entirely prohibits the collecting of interest on loans.
Lenders in these countries avoid the problem by the imposition of "service charges." Wall
St. J., May 11, 1979, at 1, col. 1.
5. The Bible, for example, offers evidence of this evolution. Old Testament references
prohibiting usury or the charging of interest to neighbors rank it with bestiality and oppres-
sion of widows and orphans. Leviticus 25:35-37.
6. By New Testament times the usefulness of usury was recognized. In the parable of
the talents, the servant who buried the money he was given to safeguard was criticized for
not having put it out to earn interest. Matthew 25:14-28.
7. For an entertaining study of interest through the ages, see S. HOMER, A HISTORY OF
INTEREST RATES (1963) and highlights from the book in Homer, An Informal History of Interest
Rates, 11 INSTITUTIONAL INVESTOR 109 (Aug. 1977).
8. F. RYAN, supra note 2. Jeremy Bentham's pamphlet set out his economic arguments
against regulating interest rates by means of usury laws instead of allowing free trade in the
money market to set the rates. Id. at x (citing J. BENTHAM, LETTES IN DEFENSE OF USURY
(1787)). These arguments were urged upon a state legislature as long ago as 1836 when the
New York Legislature considered a bill to repeal the New York usury law. Introduction to
M. SILK, THE UsURY DEBATE AFrER ADAM SMITH (1972). The opposing view prevailed; i.e.,
"money is unlike any other article, and so unlike it that the possessor has neither the legal
nor the moral right to take for it all that he can get." J. Whipple, Free Trade in Money, or
Note-Shaving, the Great Cause of Fraud, Poverty and Ruin: Stringent Usury Laws, the Best
Defense of the People Against "Hard Times," reprinted in id. at 18.
Economist Milton Friedman, in referring to LErrEs IN DEFENSE OF UsUa, supra, notes
that "During the nearly two centuries since Bentham's pamphlet was published, his argu-
ments have been widely accepted by economists and as widely neglected by politicians."
Friedman, Defense of Usury, in READINGS IN ECONoMIcs 36 (7th ed. Samuelson 1973). Recent
changes in many state usury laws are encouraging signs that this long neglect may be ending.
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Franklin W. Ryan, in his 1924 study of Usury and Usury Laws,'
distinguished between moral and legal usury, as well as between
juristic and economic rationales for usury laws. Legal usury has
been defined as "simply taking more than the law allows."' 0 Moral
usury has been defined as "taking advantage of the ignorance or
necessitous condition of the needy borrower so as to get him into a
hard bargain and exact from him unduly high charges.""
Criticism by economists that usury laws are inefficient and
unnecessary is only partly justified. Usury laws are ineffective when
they set legal usury limits in an effort to eliminate moral usury. But
usury laws are necessary, juristically, if not economically, because
moral usury is perceived by most legislatures as a social evil that
must be eradicated.
II. STATE UsuRY LAWS
The loans which usury laws regulate have been regarded as
essentially local transactions and, as such, have always been a sub-
ject of state regulation. In today's national economy, however, this
may no longer be accurate. Many borrowers and lenders are engaged
in businesses of national scope. If interest rates are economically
prohibitive in one state, lenders will tend to locate elsewhere and
businesses requiring loans will either follow or stagnate. Restrictive
usury laws are, therefore, not in the economic best interest of either
the state or the nation because they tend to create a dislocation of
financial resources.' 2
The first usury laws were adopted by the original colonies and
patterned after English law."' The typical usury law in this country,
based on the Statute of Anne, provided that excessive interest could
not be charged on "any loan or forbearance of any money, goods or
things in action.""1
Every state has enacted laws governing permissible interest
rates for various types of loans, and no two statutes are exactly
9. F. RYAN, supra note 2.
10. Id. at xii.
11. Id.
12. Giles, The Effect of Usury Law on the Credit Marketplact, 95 BANKING L.J. 527, 540
n.54 (1978).
13. The Statute of Anne, 1713, 12 Anne, c. 16. This statute sets interest at a maximum
rate of five percent. It is ironic that the elements of usury and other provisions set forth in
this act are still a part of most American usury laws, more than a century after all usury laws,
including the Statute of Anne, were repealed in England by 17 & 18 Vic., c. 90 (1854). F. RYAN,
supra note 2, at 25, 45; Lowell, A Current Analysis of the Usury Laws-A National View, 8
SAN DtEGO L. REv. 193, 195 (1971).
14. Lowell, supra note 13 (citing CAL. CONST. art. XX, § 22 (presently art. XV)).
1980]
UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW
alike. Not only do the rates differ widely, but there are also wide
variations in the methods of setting rates, the exceptions to statu-
tory rates, the applicable penalties and the allowable defenses.
A. Constitutional Interest Ceilings
Although most states enacted usury ceilings by legislative ac-
tion, in some states public sentiment against high interest rates was
so strong that usury limits were incorporated into the state constitu-
tion.1 Such limits make the interest rate inflexible and render legis-
lative or judicial exceptions to the rate subject to constitutional
challenge.
Recently these constitutional provisions themselves have come
under attack as interest rates have approached and exceeded the
mandated ceiling. In 1977, a California lower court ruled that article
XV of the California Constitution," which imposes a ten percent per
annum interest rate ceiling on some lenders but exempts others, 7
was in violation of the due process and equal protection clauses of
the fourteenth amendment, as well as in violation of the commerce
clause because it acted as a restraint on the free flow of capital into
California." On appeal, however, the California Second District
Court of Appeal reversed," holding that "California's Usury Law is
constitutional as applied to all loans."20 If there is an appeal and the
Supreme Court of California finds exemption for certain lenders to
be unconstitutional, it will have a far-reaching effect on similar
exemptions and exceptions in other states' laws, even if these excep-
tions are not of constitutional status.
In 1977,,the Supreme Court of Tennessee struck down as uncon-
stitutional a 1968 act which authorized interest rates on consumer
loans higher than the ten percent ceiling imposed by the state con-
15. ARK. CONST. art. 9, § 13; CAL. CONST. art. XV (1976, amended 1978); TENN. CONST.
art. 11, § 7 (1870, amended 1978) (maximum limitation on interest rates removed).
16. CAL. CONST. art. XV (adopted in 1934 as art. XX, § 22, subsequently modified to
become art. XV in 1976 and further amended in 1978).
17. The lenders exempt from the 10% interest rate ceiling in California are: state and
federal banks and building and loan associations, credit unions, agricultural cooperatives,
personal property brokers and industrial loan companies. CAL. CONST. art. XV, § 1 (adopted
1934, modified 1976, amended 1978).
18. Committee Against Unfair Interest Limitations v, California, [19771 5 CONS. CRED.
GUIDE (CCH) 98,039 (Cal. Super. Ct., 1977).
19. Committee Against Unfair Interest Limitations v. California, 95 Cal. App. 3d 801,
157 Cal. Rptr. 543 (Ct. App. 1979). As of this writing the committee has until Oct. 31, 1979
to file an appeal with the Supreme Court of California. See also Boerner v. Colwell Co., 21
Cal. 3d 37, 557 P.2d 200, 145 Cal. Rptr. 380 (1978).
20. 95 Cal. App. 3d at 805, 157 Cal. Rptr. at 547.
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stitution.21 Fearing tight consumer credit and high prices, Tennessee
voters repealed the constitutional usury ceiling in March 1978,
thereby empowering the legislature to set interest rates.2
Arkansas and California are the only states which still have a
constitutional usury limit. The Arkansas Constitution sets a maxi-
mum interest rate of ten percent.23 The economic effects of this limit
are notorious and have been the subject of a number of studies and
articles."' The severe penalties for usury in Arkansas make the inter-
est ceiling even more onerous.1
On February 28, 1979, the Arkansas delegation introduced a bill
in the United States House of Representatives to alleviate the
"credit crunch" until a new state constitution is presented to Arkan-
sas voters in 1980.6 The bill, H.R. 2515, was enacted as Public Law
96-104, on November 5, 1979. It applies to business and agricultural
loans in the amount of $25,000 or more and temporarily preempts
state constitutional or statutory usury ceilings, allowing insured
banks and other insured institutions and small business investment
companies to charge a maximum of five percent above the discount
rate on ninety-day prime commercial paper that is in effect at the
Federal Reserve bank in the Federal Reserve district where the fi-
nancial institution is located.Y State interest rate ceilings on other
21. Cumberland Capital Corp. v. Patty, 556 S.W.2d 516 (Tenn. 1977) (striking down the
1968 Industrial Loan and Thrift Act because it permitted charging interest in excess of the
10% maximum allowed under the state constitution); see Causey, How Tennessee "Usury"
Fight Was Won, 70 BANKING 104 (Apr. 1978).
22. Id. at 108.
23. ARK. CONST. art. 9, § 13.
These states mention a maximum contract rate of interest only in the section dealing
with the UCCC. COLO. Rav. STAT. § 5-3-201 (1973); IND. CODE ANN. § 24-45-2-201 (Burns
1974); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 14A, § 2-201 (West 1972), tit. 15, § 266 (West Supp. 1979); UTAH
CODE ANN. § 70B-3-605 (1979); Wyo. STAT. § 40-14-212 (1977).
24. See Giles, supra note 12, at 537-42; A Federal Usury Law-Uniformity at Any Rate,
IV U. CAL. D. L. REv. 421, 423 (1971); An Empirical Study of the Arkansas Usury Law: "With
Friends Like That .... " 1968 U. ILL. L.F. 544, 546-69.
25. For example, in Universal C.I.T. Credit Corp. v. Stanley, 225 Ark. 96, 279 S.W.2d
556 (1955), a buyer was allowed to cancel a usurious conditional sales contract and keep the
car which was the subject of the contract. In United-Bilt Homes, Inc. v. Knapp, 239 Ark. 940,
396 S.W.2d 40 (1965), homebuyers were permitted to keep the house as well as cancel all
indebtedness evidenced by a usurious note for the balance due on the building contract under
ARK. STAT. ANN. § 68-609 (repealed 1957). The court stated that to hold otherwise "would
render the Constitutional provision against usury practically ineffective. If the seller of an
article on a usurious contract knew he could, if caught, repossess the same, he obviously
would be more inclined to take a chance." 239 Ark. at 944, 396 S.W.2d at 42.
26. 125 Cong. Rec. 4993 (daily ed. Feb. 28, 1979) (remarks of Reps. Alexander and
Anthony).
27. Id. This is the rate allowed to national banks under 12 U.S.C. § 85 (Supp. IV 1974)
(amending 12 U.S.C. § 85 (1970)).
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types of loans, such as consumer loans and home mortgages, are not
affected under this legislation.
The Act is limited to "those States having a constitutional
provision which provides that all contracts for a greater rate of
interest than 10 per centum per annum shall be void," and expires
on the earlier of July 1, 1981, or the rejection of the Act by either
the state legislature or the voters." Thus, although the legislation
appears at first glance to be national in scope, it is restricted in its
application to Arkansas alone, and is subject to the approval of that
state's voters and legislators. With the limitations deleted, however,
this Act could serve as a mooel for a truly national usury law.
B. Economic Effects of Usury Laws
The rationale behind most state usury laws is basically un-
changed from that of the biblical prohibition: to protect the needy
from those who would take advantage of their position. Very little
attention has been paid by legislatures to whether the laws actually
fulfill their purpose. Extensive study of usury laws by economists
shows that any benefits of lower interest rates are offset by de-
creased availability of funds for lending,2" with the result that
would-be borrowers at the higher-risk end of the credit spectrum,
typically those lower-income persons whom the laws are intended
to protect, are denied credit.30 They must either do without goods
until they have accumulated enough money to pay cash, or turn to
illegal lenders, i.e., loansharks who charge a high rate of interest in
order to cover the risk of default and the risk of being caught while
engaged in an illegal activity.
Most people tend to place a high value on the present use of
goods, and thus prefer to pay a high rate of interest in order to
obtain the immediate benefit of goods .3 The high rate of inflation
28. Pub. L. No. 96-104, §§ 107, 301, 93 Stat. 789 (1979).
29. A. ALCHIAN & W. ALLEN, UNIVERsrry ECONOMICS 471 (3d ed. 1972); Greer, Rate Ceil-
ings, Market Structure, and the Supply of Finance Company Personal Loans, 29 J. FINANCE
1363 (1974), analyzed the effect of usury ceilings on the output of the personal loan market
under both competitive and monopolistic conditions and predicted that credit rationing
would occur even when usury ceilings are set above competitive levels.
30. Although it may be argued that such laws, which restrict the money available for
borrowing, actually serve to protect the poor from high interest rates, most politicians, at least
outwardly, would reject this overtly paternalistic view. Avio, An Economic Rationale for
Statutory Interest Rate Ceilings, 13 Q. Rav. ECON. & Bus. 61, 67 (Autumn 1973).
31. In fact, people of lower income are more likely to "buy now, pay later" than those
with higher incomes. According to Kenneth Avio, "[Tihe smaller disposable income is, the
greater is the weight given to present consumption vis-a-vis future consumption in the fam-
ily's plan of consumption allocation over time." Id. at 66.
[Vol. 34:325
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in the economy, which is expected to continue, makes this tendency
even more likely. Historically, high interest rates do not deter bor-
rowing when the price of goods is expected to increase and loans
obtained can be repaid with devalued dollars.2
This phenomenon can be seen today in the housing and home
mortgage industry. Interest rates on mortgages and housing prices
are at record highs, but there has been no appreciable decrease in
buyer demand even though prices and interest rates are expected to
rise even higher in coming months. These expectations have been
encouraged by the economic policies of the last several administra-
tions, which have feared a recession even more than continued infla-
tion, and have felt that a recession would be the price of any effec-
tive attempt to curb inflation.33
Inflation has led to greatly renewed interest in usury laws in the
last few years, as interest rates have soared past the statutory ceil-
ings in many states. These states have had to raise the ceiling or
suffer severe credit restrictions adversely affecting their economies.
In a recession, with or without continued inflation, the econom-
ies of states with restrictive usury laws may suffer more than those
with more liberal laws and may also take longer to recover. 34 Restric-
tive rates of interest in themselves tend to cause economic stagna-
tion, discouraging businesses from borrowing for expansion and en-
couraging lenders to invest elsewhere. The present predictions of an
imminent national recession should give added impetus to usury
law reforms.
Ill. TRENDS
Faced with the need for changing its interest and usury laws, a
state legislature has several alternative courses of action. It may
simply raise the usury ceiling to a rate above the current market
rate. It may repeal existing usury statutes and cease regulation of
interest rates. Or it may attempt to create a flexible, floating inter-
est rate. Each of these approaches has been tried, and each has
advantages and disadvantages which will be discussed below.
32. Living with High Interest Rates, FORTUNE, Oct. 23, 1978, at 9.
33. Wildstrom, Carter's Call for Lowered Expectations, Bus. WEEK, Apr. 24, 1978, at 33.
34. Giles, supra note 12, at 533-34. Giles' article contains an excellent discussion of the
economic effects of usury laws and concludes that usury statutes should be indexed to some
appropriate economic indicator. He does not, however, recommend any particular one. Id. at
546-47.
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A. General Structure of Usury Laws
All state usury laws provide for a fixed rate of interest in the
absence of a contract or express agreement. This maximum rate is
usually quite low, from five percent to eight and one-half percent,
with most states, including Florida, setting the rate at six percent
simple interest per annum. 5
This paper focuses on state laws regulating the contract rate of
interest. Consumer loans regulated by special acts, such as the Uni-
form Consumer Credit Code (UCCC), Small Loan Acts, and Retail
Installment Sales Acts, are exceptions to general state usury laws
and are therefore referred to only in passing.
Most state usury laws also create exceptions for certain types
of loans, such as large loans and corporate loans, although the defi-
nitions and thresholds for these exceptions vary widely. The laws
generally set regulations for conventional mortgage loans and small
business loans. One study estimated that in 1968 only thirty-five
percent of the total private debt in Florida was subject to the gen-
eral usury statute of the state.36 Of fifteen states studied, in only one
was more than fifty percent of the total private debt subject to the
usury statute.37 It is likely that this general pattern still prevails.
Lenders and borrowers who cannot take advantage of any of the
exceptions believe that their fourteenth amendment rights to due
process and equal protection have been violated. 8
B. Fixed or No Interest Ceiling
As of September 1979, the legal contract rate of interest (the
maximum interest rate to which parties may agree) ranged from
seven percent per annum in Michigan, to twenty-one percent per
annum in Rhode Island,' to an unlimited rate of interest in Massa-
chusetts, New Hampshire, Maine and, just recently, the District of
Columbia.40 In five states the contract rate of interest is subject only
to the limits of the UCCC enacted in those states." The two other
states that have adopted the UCCC,12 retain contract interest ceil-
ings for loans not covered by the UCCC.
35. FLA. STAT. § 687.01 (1977).
36. Benfield, Money, Mortgages, and Migraine-the Usury Headache, 19 CASE W. RES.
L. REV. 819, 856 (1968).
37. Id. at 857.
38. See notes 18 & 19 and accompanying text supra.
39. 5 CONS. CRED. G~tDE (CCH) 510 at 1301-09 (Sept. 18, 1979).
40. Id. at Report 285 (Aug. 8, 1979).
41. Colorado, Indiana, Oklahoma, Utah and Wyoming.
42. IDAHO CODE § 28-22-105 (Supp. 1979); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 16-207 (Supp. 1978).
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Among the states retaining fixed contract interest ceilings, 8%,
10% and 12% simple interest per annum are the rates most fre-
quently adopted. Florida has recently adopted an eighteen percent
general usury ceiling." All of these states provide exceptions that
allow higher rates for certain lenders or transactions.
Several states, while retaining a general fixed rate, have re-
moved interest ceilings from large loans. The threshold varies from
state to state. For example, Alaska,'" Delaware" and Ohio'7 exempt
loans in excess of $100,000. In Kentucky the threshold is only
$15,000;" in South Carolina it is $500,000."
Other states exempt business purpose loans over a certain
amount. In Iowa the threshold is $500,000 for agricultural loans and
$200,000 for business loans. In North Dakota any corporate loan
over $35,000 is exempt from the usury ceiling."
New Jersey allows any agreed upon rate of interest for loans
over $50,000, other than residential mortgages.2 New York permits
corporate loans over $250,000 and demand notes of $5000 or more
with collateral security to be made at any rate up to the twenty-five
percent criminal usury threshold.5 3
C. Floating Interest Ceiling
A number of other states have enacted statutes permitting a
floating interest rate tied to various economic indicators. Usually a
special state committee or the state banking commissioner has au-
thority to change the interest rate in response to changes in the
economy, following a prescribed procedure.' This type of legislation
provides flexibility to keep state lenders competitive with the na-
tional market rate and also provides protection to borrowers against
being charged an excessive rate of interest out of line with current
economic reality. All of these provisions have been enacted within
the past ten years.
States with floating interest rates use several different eco-
43. 5 CONS. CRED. GUIDE (CCH) $ 510 at 1302-09.
44. 1979 Fla. Laws, ch. 79-274, § 13 (amending FLA. STAT. § 687.03 (1978)).
45. ALASKA STAT. § 45.45.010(b) (Supp. 1978).
46. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 2301(c) (Supp. 1977).
47. OHio REV. CODE ANN. § 1343.01(B)(1) (Page Supp. 1978).
48. Ky. REV. STAT. § 360.010(1)(b) (Supp. 1978).
49. S.C. CODE § 34-31-30 (Supp. 1978).
50. IOWA CODE ANN. § 535.2(2) (West Supp. 1979).
51. N.D. CENT. CODE § 47-14-09 (Interim Supp. 1979).
52. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 31-1-1(b)(1) (West Supp. 1979).
53. N.Y. GEN. OBLIG. LAW § 5-501(1)-(6) (McKinney 1978).
54. See, e.g., W. VA. CODE § 47-6-5b (Supp. 1979).
1980]
UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW
nomic indicators as indices, yielding a range not only of rates, but
of stability for the rates set. Some economic indicators are very
sensitive to changes in the money market, while others are more
stable. The problem facing state legislatures when choosing an ap-
propriate index for interest rates is to select one which is neither so
volatile that it becomes inflationary, nor so unresponsive that it is
as restrictive as the fixed rates it is intended to replace.
Most of the states with a floating interest rate ceiling use one
of two general types of economic indicators as an index for interest
rates: either the monthly index of long term (ten years or more)
United States government bond yields or a short term money mar-
ket indicator, such as the Federal Reserve discount rate, the com-
mercial bank prime rate or the discount rate for ninety-day com-
mercial paper at the district Federal Reserve bank. To each of these
indices is added a fixed percentage as compensation for the lender.
On the average, states allow lenders to charge about two percent
above the government bond yield rates and three to five percent
above the money market rates.
At present six states index interest rates to United States gov-
ernment bond yields.55 Three of these states" apply the rate so de-
rived only to specified loans; the others apply it generally.
Long term government bond yields are almost risk-free rates.57
They are therefore a more stable economic indicator than short term
money market rates which vary more widely in response to changing
economic forecasts. Mortgage loans are also usually long term and
are affected similarly by factors affecting bond yields. Thus, states
which distinguish between commercial and home mortgage loan
rates use bond yields as the index for mortgage interest rates.
Historically, long term bonds have a higher yield than short
term bonds.58 At present, however, an inverse yield condition exists,
so that shorter term government notes and bonds have a higher yield
than those with longer maturities.' Among long term government
55. See GA. CODE ANN. § 57-101-1 (Supp. 1979); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 74, § 4, 2(a) (Smith-
Hurd Supp. 1979); IOWA CODE ANN. § 535.2, 3(a) (West Supp. 1979); N.Y. BANKING LAW §
14-a (McKinney 1979); N.Y. GEN. OBLIG. LAW § 5-501(1) (McKinney 1979). 41 PA. CONS.
STAT. ANN. § 301 (Purdon 1979); W. VA. CODE § 47-6-5b (Supp. 1979).
56. GA. CODE ANN. § 57-101-1 (Supp. 1979); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 74, § 4, 2(a) (Smith-Hurd
Supp. 1979); 41 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 301 (Purdon 1979); W. VA. CODE § 47-6-5b (Supp.
1979).
57. G. MUNN, ENCYCLOPEDIA OF BANKING AND FINANCE 948 (7th ed. 1973).
58. "Yield" refers to the investment rate of return of a bond, the net income derived if
the bond is held to maturity. It is a function of the price, interest rate and term of the bond.
Id.
59. When short term rates rise above long term rates, it is due to a general expectation
that either inflation or growth is going to increase. Since no significant recession is forecast
[Vol. 34:325
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securities, the yield rate on ten-year government bonds is slightly
higher than on all long term government bonds, including the
twenty-year bonds. 0
In general, the interest rates indexed to bond yields are lower
than those indexed to short term money market indicators. Accord-
ing to the August 1979 Federal Reserve Bulletin, United States
Treasury notes and bonds with a ten-year maturity had an average
yield rate of 8.95% in July; twenty-year bonds had a yield rate of
8.92%; and the long term composite yield rate was 8.35%.1 In con-
trast, the Federal Reserve discount rate for July was 9.69%11 and the
prime rate charged by banks on short term business loans was
11.54%.13 Lenders were allowed to add from 1.5 to 3% to the bond
yield rates and up to 5% to the short term money market rates,
depending on state law.6'
The Federal Reserve discount rate is the fee charged by Federal
Reserve district banks to member commercial banks for advances. 5
This rate is adjusted by the Federal Reserve to conform to other
money market rates and is used to control what member banks
charge their customers. Alaska 7 and Delaware 8 index interest
rates for all types of loans up to $100,000 to the Federal Reserve
discount rate.
Another index used, the prime rate, is the interest rate on short
term commercial loans charged by commercial banks to their most
credit-worthy customers. 9 The prime rate, being set by the banks,
is the rate least subject to direct federal management and in theory
the rate most reflective of the true state of the economy. Banks,
however, tend to follow closely variations in the Federal Reserve
discount rate, setting their prime rates about two percent higher.
Use of the prime rate results in the highest interest rate of the
economic indicators discussed. Only two states use it, and then only
to a limited extent. Nevada indexes interest rates to the lowest daily
at the moment, present expectations are that both kinds of rates will probably increase.
Living with High Interest Rates, supra note 32, at 9.
60. "Long'term" is defined in the Federal Reserve Bulletin as being all bonds maturing
in more than 10 years.
61. Interest Rates, Money and Capital Markets, FED. RES. BULL. A27 (Aug. 1979).
62. Monetary Aggregates and Interest Rates, FED. RES. BULL. A3 (Aug. 1979).
63. Prime Rate Charged by Banks, FED. RES. BULL. A26 (Aug. 1979).
64. Id.
65. G. MUNN, supra note 57, at 784-86.
66. Prime Rate Charged by Banks, supra note 63.
67. ALASKA STAT. § 45.45.010(b) (Supp. 1978).
68. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 2301(a) (Supp. 1977).
69. See G. MUNN, supra note 57, at 749-50.
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prime rate at the three largest domestic banks. 0 This rate takes
effect only after Nevada's statutory ceiling of twelve percent has
been reached." Puerto Rico ties interest rates to the prime rate
prevailing at major New York City banks, but only for commercial
loans in excess of $1 million."
Of the three short term money market indicators used by var-
ious states, the one most often employed as an index is the local
district Federal Reserve bank discount rate on ninety-day commer-
cial paper. This "eligible" paper consists of notes arising out of
commercial transactions which are discounted to a bank and redis-
counted to the Federal Reserve bank.73
Four states and national banks7 have interest rates indexed to
the discount rate on ninety-day commercial paper. Minnesota lim-
70. NEV. REV. STAT. § 99.050(2) (1975).
71. Id.
72. Act No. 1 of Oct. 15, 1973, 1973 P.R. Laws 849. By this act, the Legislative Assembly
of the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico created the Board for Regulating Rates of Interest and
Financing Charges, empowered to raise interest rates above the maximum prescribed in other
parts of the Civil Code of Puerto Rico. This power is to be exercised:
when it can be reasonably anticipated that because of disagreements between the
rates of interest prevailing in the market and the maximum ones permitted by
law in Puerto Rico, there is the risk that the investment of capital in determined
economic sectors or activities in Puerto Rico might be halted or reduced.
Id. at 850.The factors to be considered in setting the rate are:
the prevailing market cost for the money available to finance different economic
lines or activities and the damage which might occur to the economy in general,
to any of its sectors or to the citizen, if no action is taken to change, by increasing
or decreasing, the effective rates of interest or charges at a given moment.
Id.
This legislation provides great flexibility in interest rate setting because it considers and
harmonizes both prevailing market conditions in various segments of the economy and "the
right of the debtor to protection against the imposition [of] excessive charges." Id. as
amended by Act No. 120 of June 2, 1976, 1976 P.R. Laws 349. The board acts by promulgating
regulations from time to time which take effect after being filed in the legislature and state
department and being published for three days in Puerto Rican newspapers of general circula-
tion. The board has established various fixed interest rates, e.g., 10% on first mortgages, but
has also provided for a variable rate as noted in the text.
73. Federal Reserve Board regulation A defines obligations which are eligible for redis-
count at a Federal Reserve bank. 12 C.F.R. § 201.4 (1979).
74. The rate that national banks may charge in the absence of contrary state law is set
out in 12 U.S.C.A. § 85 (West Supp. 1979).
When no rate is fixed by the laws of the State, or Territory, or District, the bank
may take, receive, reserve, or charge a rate not exceeding 7 per centum, or 1 per
centum in excess of the discount rate on ninety-day commercial paper in effect
at the Federal reserve bank in the Federal reserve district where the bank is
located, or in the case of business or agricultural loans in the amount of $25,000
or more, at a rate of 5 per centum in excess of the discount rate on ninety-day
commercial paper in effect at the Federal Reserve bank in the Federal Reserve
district where the bank is located, whichever may be the greater . . ..
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its use of this index to business and agricultural loans,75 while Ohio
restricts its use to real estate loans.76 In Montana interest on loans
up to $150,000 is indexed to the ninety-day commercial paper dis-
count rate." Kentucky ties interest rates charged by state chartered
banks and trust companies to this index in order to achieve parity
with national banks in the state.7"
The usefulness of the ninety-day commercial paper discount
rate is due to the fact that it is based on actual commercial transac-
tions, and is thus more directly responsive to changes in the econ-
omy than bond yields. It is also the most riskless short term money
market rate; in effect, it is the prime rate of the Federal Reserve
System. Federal Reserve Board regulation A ensures that this
"eligible" paper is not speculative in nature and has the endorse-
ment of the bank presenting it for discount.79
IV. ANALYSIS OF TRENDS
Changing an existing usury law by merely raising the maximum
rate of interest permitted in order to preserve the underlying ration-
ale for the law is deceptively simple. If people are conditioned to
think that any rate over a certain magic number is per se illegal, it
will be very difficult to convince anyone that the new rate is fair. If
a rose by any other name smells just as sweet, interest at a rate
higher than the old maximum will still stink of usury. This illus-
trates the basic problem of usury laws: trying to solve the problem
of moral usury by means of legal interest rates. In addition, if the
rate is raised high enough above current rates to make unnecessary
frequent amendments if inflation continues, the effect is as if the
interest ceiling had been abolished altogether. In such cases, the
rate will not be a factor considered by lenders or borrowers, because
it is unlikely to affect them.
A possible solution is to follow the British and European exam-
ple of not setting legal interest rates at all. 80 Massachusetts, New
Hampshire and the District of Columbia have followed this route.
Any rate of interest is permissible if agreed to in writing by the
parties. Borrowers are protected, however, by the common law prin-
ciple that equity will not enforce an unconscionable contract. In
75. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 334.01(1) (West Supp. 1978).
76. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1343.01(B) (Page 1978).
77. MONT. REV. CODES ANN. § 47-125(5) (Cum. Supp. 1977).
78. Ky. REV. STAT. § 287.214 (Interim Supp. 1979).
79. G. MUNN, supra note 57, at 289, 341.
80. Great Britain and most of the European countries repealed their usury laws in the
19th century. Benfield, supra note 36, at 821.
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most instances, courts in Great Britain and the European countries
have the power to remake a contract by setting a fair rate of inter-
est.8
Some disadvantages to this solution are that needy borrowers
may be afraid to complain of unconscionable charges or that bor-
rowers may not even be aware of the unreasonableness of interest
rates charged. Despite federally mandated disclosure of interest and
finance charges,8" most consumers probably either ignore or do not
understand the information disclosed in the agreements they are
signing. Unlimited interest rates are therefore appropriate only in
business loans and not in consumer loans.
The best solution for consumer loans is one that realistically
attempts to harmonize society's competing goals of freedom of con-
tract and protection of the needy. Such harmony is best achieved
by means of a floating interest rate which is high enough to provide
lenders a competitive return on their money but not so high as to
place an undue burden on borrowers.
Even a floating interest rate may still be too restrictive if set
at or only slightly above a single unresponsive economic measure.
Because some indicators do not always respond with sufficient
speed or accuracy to changes in the economy, the market rate of
interest may occasionally exceed the floating rate. This fact causes
lenders to either increase the number of loans not subject to the
interest rate ceiling, or to tighten credit requirements, or to stop
lending entirely. The Pennsylvania and New York usury laws, tied
to long term United States security yields, have been criticized for
being too restrictive in this fashion." The index used to set a varia-
ble interest rate must therefore be carefully chosen.
The most generally accepted rate used as an interest index
appears to be the discount rate on ninety-day commercial paper. It
is neither the highest nor the lowest rate, and it is flexible in re-
sponding to economic changes.8 If all types of loans were to be tied
to one rate, the discount rate on ninety-day commercial paper is
perhaps the best choice, for it is the one most indicative of a fair
price for money under existing business conditions. It is neither
inflationary nor recessionary. It may be desirable, however, to dis-
tinguish between rates for short term business loans and for long
81. Id. at 821 n.7.
82. Truth in Lending Act, 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 1601-1692 (West 1974 & Supp. 1979).
83. McNulty, The Impact of Usury Ceilings on Home Financing, 8 REAL EST. REv. 68,
70-72 (Summer 1978).84. See text accompanying notes 74-79 supra.
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term mortgage loans.85 In that case, it would be preferable to follow
Illinois and Minnesota in basing home mortgage rates on long term
government bond yields and business loans on the ninety-day com-
mercial paper discount rate.
Florida's usury statute is fairly typical of states with "fixed
ceiling" rates." In 1977, however, the Florida Legislature amended
the statute by adding section 687.12, the Interest Parity Act. This
equalization amendment presumably was intended to allow all
lenders making the same type of loan to charge the same rate of
interest. The language of the section, however, refers only to li-
censed lenders, or lenders or creditors lending through a licensee."
Not included in the preceding categories are insurance companies
and mortgage banking companies, both of which provide financing
for residential real estate mortgages, just as do thrift institutions.
The effect of the section thus falls short of placing all lenders on an
equal footing in making the same type of loan."
The Supreme Court of Florida has recently handed down two
decisions upholding the constitutionality of sections of the Florida
usury statute. In Cesary v. Second National Bank" the court upheld
the exception allowing industrial savings (Morris Plan) banks to
charge in excess of ten percent against the allegation that the sec-
tions" violated the constitutional prohibition against enactment of
special laws." In Catogas v. Southern Federal Savings & Loan
Association," decided the same day, the court upheld the higher
interest rate exception for state building and loan associations and
construed it as applying to federally chartered savings and loan
associations as well. 3
In neither case did the supreme court refer to the Interest Parity
Act, section 687.12; thus, the constitutionality of the act remains
untested. Given the tenor of the two recent decisions, however, in
sweeping away constitutional challenges to the interest rate struc-
ture, "the assumption [is] that, in any review of the Parity Act by
the present Supreme Court, the economic utility of [the Act] would
85. See text accompanying notes 57-64 supra.
86. See FLA. STAT. § 687 (1977 & Supp. 1978), as amended by 1979 Fla. Laws chs. 79-90,
79-138, 79-274.
87. FLA. STAT. § 687.12 (1977).
88. Sanders, Florida's Usury Law in Transition-the Aftermath of the Supreme Court
Decisions, 53 FLA. B.J. 315, 317-18 (1979).
89. 369 So. 2d 917 (Fla. 1979).
90. FLA. STAT. §§ 656.17(l), 687.031 (1977).
91. FLA. CONST. art. In, § 11(a)(9).
92. 369 So.2d 922 (Fla. 1979).
93. FLA. STAT. §§ 665.395, 665.511 (1977).
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be given at least equal consideration with any constitutional short-
comings which might be asserted."'" Therefore, any further exten-
sion of exceptions allowed, or any liberalization of the usury laws
to permit higher interest rates to all lenders making real estate
loans, would probably be upheld by this supreme court.
In the 1979 session of the state legislature, several changes were
made in Florida's usury laws." The most important were those
made by Session Law 274 (S.B. 1262),"1 which took effect July 1,
1979. The changes effect substantial increases in the maximum in-
terest rates allowed on various types of loans. Most consumer loans
made on or after July 1, 1979, will have an interest ceiling of eight-
een percent instead of the confusing 10%, 12%, 14%, 15% and 16%
rates formerly applicable to different types of consumer loans. Al-
lowable finance charges are also increased by the legislation. The
law applies to loans by licensed lenders and financial institutions
for new car, home improvement, mobile home and credit card loans.
The most controversial provision of the new law allows retail
stores, offering installment financing mostly on durable consumer
goods such as major applicances, to charge up to 21.5% annual
interest. According to lobbyists for retail finance interests, retailers
were having difficulty selling their installment contracts because of
the low interest rate ceiling. 7
This increase was sought last year in the so-called "Phoenix
Bill,"' 8 which was defeated several times by the Commerce Commit-
tee of the Florida House of Representatives before finally being
brought to the floor and defeated there also." Although the present
statute cleared legislative hurdles, it met with some gubernatorial
resistance. The bill became law without Governor Graham's signa-
ture.'" A related bill, S.B. 331, which was passed in both houses of
the legislature and which would have lifted interest ceilings for large
corporate loans, was vetoed by Governor Graham. 0' Like the
"Phoenix Bill," S.B. 331 is likely to be reintroduced in the 1980
94. Sanders, supra note 88, at 317.
95. One change provided for remedial avoidance of penalties for usury. See 1979 Fla.
Laws, ch. 79-90. Another change provided that the usury rates would not apply to loans made
to nonresident aliens. See 1979 Fla. Laws, ch. 79-138.
96. 1979 Fla. Laws, ch. 79-274 (amending §§ 516.02, 516.031(1), 516.18(l), 516.21, 657.14,
659.18, 659.181, 687.02, 520.34(5), 687.04 (1977), and §§ 520.08(1)(a), 656.381(4)-(5), and
687.03(1) (Supp. 1978), and repealing § 687.11 (1977)).
97. Miami Herald, May 10, 1979, § A, at 28, col. 1.
98. Id., May 18, 1979, § A, at 14, col. 1.
99. Id.
100. Id.
101. 1979 Fla. Digest of General Laws liv.
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legislative session. Also to be considered during the coming session
are changes in the Interest Parity Act. The comptroller was man-
dated to make an extensive study of the act and make recommenda-
tions to the legislature. 1o
At the same time the 1980 legislature should consider changing
the Florida interest rate structure itself. Despite the increases in
permissible rates this year, it is only a matter of time until the rates
for some types of loans must be increased again. Rates for short term
loans should be indexed to an appropriate short term money market
rate, to obviate the need for piecemeal tinkering with the usury
statute. Similarly, rates for long term loans should be indexed to an
appropriate long term indicator.
V. CONCLUSION
Florida should adopt an interest rate tied to an appropriate
economic indicator or set of such indicators, at least for mortgage
loans and other personal loans. The interest rate for business loans
should be unregulated, regardless of the amount of the loan. If some
regulation is unavoidable, the threshold amount for unregulated
loans should be set at a very low figure, such as $5000.
Just as in the area of securities regulation, full disclosure of all
material information to a knowledgable borrower should be suffi-
cient protection.
The question then is what factors should be considered in set-
ting a floating interest rate? At least two states with floating rates
on mortgages have been criticized for choosing formulae which are
too restrictive.10 Both Minnesota and Pennsylvania tied their inter-
est rates to the monthly index of yields on United States Treasury
securities, a figure which is lower than other indicators because of
the inclusion of certain classes of very low yielding bonds. Illinois
ties its rates to the same figure and is therefore subject to the same
criticism.
It is suggested that Florida adopt a floating interest rate ceiling
on conventional consumer loans, applicable to all lenders, based on
a fixed percentage above the discount rate on ninety-day prime
commercial paper at the Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta for the
preceding or second preceding month. This ceiling would provide an
interest rate neither excessive nor restrictive and in accord with
federal legislation. "
102. Miami Herald, supra note 98.
103. McNulty, supra note 83.
104. See note 74 supra.
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The trend at the national level is increasingly toward federal
regulation of interest rates. Already existing are federal laws that
regulate other aspects of the loan industry, such as criminal loan-
sharking and disclosure, 105 which have withstood scrutiny under the
commerce clause.' Loans and interest rates are no longer purely
local phenomena, any.more than loansharking is, and thus the real-
ity of a national economy should enable federal legislation of inter-
est rates to pass muster under the commerce clause. 07 If the trend
in state legislatures toward flexible interest rates does not continue,
the states may well find themselves preempted by federal usury
laws within a few years. Therefore, in order to forestall federal
preemption, or in the event that preemption becomes inevitable, to
minimize its disruptive effects, Florida should pass a usury law
conforming to the usury rate most likely to be adopted by federal
law. 108
105. Truth in Lending Act, 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 1601-1693 (West 1974 & Supp. 1979); Extor-
tion Credit Transactions, 18 U.S.C. § 891-96 (1974).
106. Perez v. United States, 402 U.S. 146 (1971).
107. See generally A Federal Usury Law-Uniformity at Any Rate, supra note 24.
108. The rates set in 12 U.S.C.A. § 85 (West Supp. 1979) are the most probable candi-
dates for such adoption of a new federal law. See note 74 supra.
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